After more than a year of destruction and chaos, Syria’s children are now aware that not only it is violent people who have taken away their families and demolished their houses, but also that there is a higher authority above them giving them orders, and it is their president, Bashar Al-Assad. Children are now forced into understanding this complex concept of “politics”.
Source:
Youtube
A Martyr between Two Fires…Captain Amjad al-Hameed
By: Ibrahim al-Assil
In March 18th 2012, Captain Amjad al-Hameed was martyred in an ambush set by an unknown group. In April 5th 2012 the spokesperson of his own Brigade “God’s Men” declared that they accuse Lou’ay al-Zo’by (Secretary General of the “Believers Participate” Salafi group) of carrying out this murder. Of course, this remains an ‘accusation’ that requires evidence. Our concern is not whether Lou’ay al-Zo’by and his group were really behind the killing of Captian Amjad al-Hameed or not. We are concerned here about the harbingers of internal armed confrontations amongst the opposition to the Syrian regime. استمر في القراءة
مألوبة فيلم قصير من ابداع الشباب السوري.
Yaman Al Qadery, a former detainee at the Air Force Intelligence Directorate, tells the story of her detention for the first time on the Al Hiwar Channel, She mentions important details describing the gruesome unethical behavior of State Security forces that violate international laws.
She also confirmed a rape incident committed by the pro-government gangs the “Shabiha” on campus at Damascus university.
The Road of Convoys – The Town of Talbiseh
طريق القوافل – تلبيسة
Documentary about Talbiseh and the syrian revolution, August 2011
وثائقي عن مدينة تلبيسة والثورة السورية صوّر في آب 2011
(حقوق النشر محفوظة للمنتج. لشراء حقوق عرض الفيلم على الشاشات الفضائية او السينمائية أو غيرها, الرجاء الاتصال بنا)
(Copyrights are reserved to the producer. For more information about buying the copyrights of this movie please contact us)
On the national highway “the road of convoys” crossing Syria from north to south and linking its major cities of Damascus and Aleppo, and about 13km north of Homs in the center of Syria lies the village of Talbiseh. Known for its swamps and agriculture farmlands and laid back lifestyle of its 40000 or so local population.
The documentary was shot around August 2011 and provides eyewitness accounts of the suffering of the locals following the Syrian Army surrounder of and raid on their village starting on the dawn of 29th of May 2011. The raid was in response to local demonstrations asking for freedom and dignity and was accompained by a wave of mass arrests. The documentary includes interviews with local activists talking about the origins of the protest movement in Talbiseh as well as with locals sharing their personal stories of tragedy.
Some of the banners raised and slogans chanted by the demonstrators in the film:
No matter how much people you kill, Syria won’t kneal for you.
Today its Mobarak and tomorrow it will be your turn.
Bashar listen to us: We are the people and God is on our side.
Oh People of Syria… our blood is one so let’s finish what we started. The Coordination Committe in Talbiseh.
A flyer on the ground: To our brothers in the Army and State Security force… Al Assad has sold us out and shed our blood. Please take notice because he’ll sell you out like he did for us and we fear for your blood and honour my brother.
على الطريق الدولي (طريق القوافل) الذي يمر عبر سوريا من شمالها إلى جنوبها، ليصل مدنها الرئيسية بالعاصمة دمشق ومدينة حلب، وعلى بعد ثلاثة عشر كيلو متراً شمال مدينة حمص الواقعة وسط سوريا، تقع قرية “تلبيسة” المعروفة بمستنقعاتها وأراضيها الزراعية، وحياتها البسيطة لسكانها المحليين الذين يبلغ عددهم 40000 نسمة.
تم تصوير هذا الفيلم الوثائقي في شهر أغسطس/ آب من العام 2011، حيث يسلط الضوء على شهادات تتحدث عن معاناة سكانها المحليين جراء الحصار وعمليات الدهم التي شنتها قوات الجيش السوري عليها مع بزوغ فجر التاسع والعشرين من شهر مايو/أيار 2011. جاءت حملات المداهمة تلك رداً على المظاهرات المحلية التي اندلعت مطالبة بالحرية والكرامة، وترافقت بموجة اعتقالات واسعة. يتضمن هذا الوثائقي مقابلات مع ناشطين محليين يتحدثون عن بداية اندلاع حركة الاحتجاجات في بلدة تلبيسة، بالإضافة إلى أشخاص محليين شاركونا قصصهم المأساوية.
Mustafa Khalifa – Syrian writer
Posted on 17th February
Many observers, political analysts, and even some politicians, have almost reached a consensus that the Assad regime in Syria is about to collapse. They agree that the issue right now is just a matter of how long it will take, alongside the high cost associated with this extension of time, both on humanitarian and other levels.
However, despite the high expectations that the Assad regime will collapse, one may question: what if the “miracle” aspired by the Syrian regime takes place, and the security/military solution grants the regime and its allies the results they desired? In other words, what if the Syrian regime wins over its own people once again? Furthermore, what would be the implications of such a victory on the domestic level within Syria, as well as on regional and international levels?
Before discussing the results of this hypothetical “victory” of the Assad regime, it is useful to address some of the basic characteristics of the regime that could affect these results.
The most important of characteristics of the Assad regime that need to be addressed are the following: the extreme brutality and ruthlessness in killing people, which is described by the opposition as “the criminal nature of the regime”. This cruelty is carried out with a punitive and vindictive hateful tendency. The second very prominent characteristic is the regime’s arrogance and haughty superiority over others, resulting in the reluctance of the regime to make any concessions under pressure; no matter how trivial or even useful it may be to it. If forced to make any concession, the regime will look down with severe hatred at the party that forced it to give up this waiver and will hunt opportunities to retreat from it and, later, spitefully oppress who it believes has “twisted its arm”.
The “victory” of the regime will not be achieved unless the level of repression rises to a point where the opposition cannot bear it, be it genocide or anything of that sort. If this genocide is coupled with the silence of international community, its complacency of just condemning and denouncing Al-Assad, and its placing some sanctions that are insignificant to the regime, the regime would thus interpret these reactions of the international community as a green light to do what it wills inside Syria without any consequences, and, of course, the regime’s interpretation would be absolutely right.
Documentary by Orient TV about Abdelbaset Sarout, the Syrian youth football team goalkeeper turned activist
Click CC for English translation
Yasin al-Haj Saleh
29/January/2012
Without putting it in the context of 320 days of unrestrained violence that is practiced against it by the regime, there is no point in discussing the growing military dimension of the Syrian revolution nor the ongoing intellectual, political, and psychological transformations occurring in society and revolutionary environments throughout this bloody period. The regime tangled the military in confrontations at the focal points of the revolution, killing many of its members for refusing to shoot on their fellow citizens (Human Rights Watch report in December). As a result a number of soldiers and officers defected forming eventually a loose umbrella organization called the “Free Syrian Army.”
Cities and towns in the governorates of Deraa, Damascus’s suburbs, Homs, Hama, Idlib, and Deir Al-Zour were exposed to disciplinary campaigns similar to those of the colonial era, which prompted civilians to carry arms and confront the regime’s forces. We should not forget that it was the regime which from the beginning entangled civilians in the conflict on a large scale: the “Shabbiha”.
These circumstances, which are known to all, mean that the military component of the revolution is integral and thus it cannot be overlooked when thinking about it and planning it politically. This is not an external component, nor does it possess a specific pre-revolution ideology.
The military component does not negate the general peaceful character of the revolution; neither in the beginning nor today. The pacifism of the revolution is inherent in its societal composition; in the kind of demands that drive it; in its main tool of protest (demonstrations); and not in any ideological preferences or political tactics. It’s known that the opposition between peaceful demonstrations that raise banners and chant slogans and armed groups shooting bullets does not say anything about the reality of the situation. It serves only to hide the mouthpieces’ ignorance of what is actually with hollow comparisons.
The truth of the matter is that keeping protests peaceful was not feasible in most locations were it not for the “Free Syrian Army” with its military and civilian components to provide relative protection and deterrence against the regime’s striking arms.
Rejecting to realise this reality neither changes it, nor allows understanding it, nor affects the possibility of influencing it. The unending repetition of anti-militarization and anti-armament arguments without the slightest signal of abandoning violence on the part of the regime is like blaming the victims for their resistance to the aggressor. There are no nationalist or human justifications for attitudes such as this.
In an ideal situation, there is no doubt that peaceful resistance is preferred to armed struggle. However, we’re not in a pick-and-choose position, but in a discernible reality that imposed on a greater number of Syrians to defend themselves against a regime whose very being –and not temporary conditions or “popular demands” (as per the words of one Syrian minister)—that engenders violence and hatred.
We are required to comprehend and expect that the tendency towards militarization may be, actually it is today, accompanied with chaotic and undisciplined practices. We cannot deal with this emerging reality with a puritanical logic that rejects any armed resistance or opposes the revolution itself with the excuse that chaotic practices are occurring within it. This is not feasible as long as the regime continue to pursue its “militarization”. What is feasible is to work within the revolution, not outside it or above it, towards the direction of uniting the armed soldiers and civilians into one coordinated body and enjoining this military component in the general interest of the revolution. This is not easy; and nothing guarantees it will be achieved as desired. However, to continue in this naïve talk of pacifism is a prescription of absolute failure to realise it.
Apart from the possibilities of chaos, violence is elitist and undemocratic in essence. Therefore, expanding the practice of violence, even when disciplined, would raise the threshold for participation in the revolution making the involvement of women, children, and old people marginal. Nevertheless, our choices are not between militarization and non-militarization; but between a non-disciplined, unrestrained militarization, on the one hand, and another form of militarization that is less unrestrained and maybe more disciplined, on the other hand.
A political transformation that is achieved through military force causes various social, political, and security complications. It is thus less favourable to democratic development than a transformation that is happening peacefully. However, again, our choices are limited. The military component of the revolution is a side effect of the regime’s elemental violence, and not the outcome of any party’s will or decision.
The main point in this discussion is that there is no opportunity to restore the lost innocence before blood was spilt or the chants of confronting the violence of the regime “bare chested”, especially when expressed by those who do not participate in this revolution; neither with chests nor with bottoms. Instead of imaginary innocence, initiatives are required to establish the moral, political, and military discipline needed for militarization. The duty of intellectuals and politicians is to organize and rationalize not disassociate and distance themselves from the chaotic reality in front of us. That is defeatism.
In reality, some of what is being said in regard to militarization comes is motivated by an objection to the revolution itself and not by the legitimacy of practices occurring within it. The revolution aims to undermine the legitimacy of the regime and deny its national and general character; hence showing its violence to be factional and non-national, and denying any legitimacy or generality to its agencies. The new legitimacy and generality is the revolution itself. While this legitimacy cannot be conferred automatically on all violent acts occurring in the name of the “revolution” or under its umbrella, the only position that allows uniform opposition to undisciplined violence is one inside and with the revolution, not outside or against it. Undoubtedly the violence of the revolution is more legitimate in comparison to the violence of a regime that kills its people. Additionally, the revolution’s violence is further legitimized because it is compulsory and carried out in self-defense essentially, even though it may takes the initiative to attack for tactical purposes.
There is indeed a peaceful spirit at the core of the revolution that is resisting the urge to react violently, even for self-defense. However, the best defense of pacifism is participation in the revolution, including fieldwork, and working diligently to preserve its civil nature. The worst defense is standing on the side, while singing for pacifism.
From a practical perspective, there is a need for a public legitimate institutional body that exceeds the outward embracement of the cause of the revolution and standing by it to involvement in it besides growing intellectually, politically, and organizationally in accordance with its increasing development and complexity. Such a general body can coordinate between the components of the revolutions and leading it to its desired national goal. This has not occurred. However, what is most optimistic about in regard to the Syrian revolution is the plurality of centers of intellect and initiative. These centers are not directed by anyone and they persistently work to regulate the militarization of the revolution and develop its general civil character.
Original article in Arabic
المترجمون السوريون الأحرار | Free Syrian Translators 